Category Archives: Infrastructure and methodologies for the. justification of nuclear power programmes

National technical capability development in nuclear power programmes

S. K. SHARMA, formerly of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India, India Abstract: This chapter briefly describes the need and the means for developing national technical capabilities for setting up the first nuclear power plant (NPP) in a country and its operation and management in the long term. Orientation training of staff in nuclear science and technology, including training in […]

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The justification process

Any justification exercise, whether relating to a simple new medical or radiation application, a new nuclear power programme or any other nuclear installation or relevant activity, should be undertaken within a formal regu­latory process. Such a process will provide a list of projects which can be submitted for justification, define the corresponding justification authority, incorporate guides for submitting the different […]

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EC6

The Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6) is a 740 MWe pressure tube reactor designed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). The EC6 design benefits from the proven principles and characteristics of the CANDU 6 design, which is currently in operation in several countries in the world, such as natural uranium fuel, two independent safety shutdown systems, a separate low-temperature, low-pressure […]

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District heating

Economic studies generally indicate that district heating costs from nuclear power are in the same range as costs associated with fossil-fueled plants. In the past, the low prices of fossil fuels have stunted the introduction of single-purpose nuclear district heating plants. Although many concepts of small-scale heat-producing nuclear plants have been presented during the years, very few have been built. […]

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Severe accidents

One of the most important conclusions in the INSAG-12 report (INSAG, 1999a) is the upper frequency target of 10-4 or less per year for severe core damage. This principle is discussed under the heading 2.3 Technical Safety Objective, paragraphs 19 to 27, in the INSAG-12 document. The objective of this approach is to establish an upper bound recurrence frequency of […]

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Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and international organizations

The INPO organization was formed in 1979 in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident. A number of US industry leaders recognized that the industry must do a better job of policing itself to ensure that an event of this magnitude should never happen again. INPO was formed to establish standards of excellence against which the plants […]

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Need for emergency planning as the last barrier of defence and mitigation of the radiological consequences of potential accidents

The primary means of preventing and mitigating the consequences of acci­dents is the ‘defence in depth’ concept (IAEA, 1996a). Defence in depth is implemented primarily through the combination of a number of consecu­tive and independent levels of protection that would have to fail before harmful effects could be caused to people and to the environment. Defence in depth is provided […]

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Non-proliferation responsibilities

The issue of proliferation extends beyond the NPT and the corresponding NNWS’s obligation to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material and to undertake a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As this book is focused on infrastructure and methodologies for the justification of nuclear power programmes, the three milestones36 described in the Milestones publication (IAEA, 2007a) are […]

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Disposal of LLW and ILW

LLW is defined as waste that contains only limited amounts of long-lived radionuclides, but still requires robust isolation and containment for periods up to a few hundred years. It is suitable for disposal in engineered near­surface facilities. ILW has a radioactivity content that requires disposal at greater depths, of the order of tens of metres to a few hundred metres. […]

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Information, dialogue, debate: how to interact with stakeholders?

In recent years, particularly in western countries, there has been an increas­ingly marked distinction between giving information, which is a ‘top-down’ process, and stakeholder involvement, which tends to involve groups and citizens who declare an interest in nuclear choice in the decision process. The degree of citizen involvement in the decision process is variable, ranging from compulsory involvement or (as […]

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